Post by Silver on Jun 15, 2017 12:48:18 GMT
On the “Macedonian” sarissa-phalanx
The infamous Macedonian phalanx, the evolution of the hoplite phalanx of the Greek city-states, was for almost three whole centuries the dominant infantry formation and backbone of the greatest kingdoms in the Levantine and eastern Mediterranean basin. Developed by King Philip II of Macedonia, it was inspired by his time as a “guest” in Thebes, where he observed the tactics and organization of the Theban hoplite army, which differed in many ways from the traditional one of Athenian and Spartan fame. Philip would incorporate these concepts in his military reforms, along with his own ideas and organized to accommodate the peasant-army of Macedon, compared to the part-time professional citizen militia of the Greek cities.
A quick overview is warranted as the tactical make-up of the phalanx remained virtually unchanged over the centuries; Philip’s Macedonian phalanx (plural: phalanxes, a pikeman in the phalanx is called a phalangite) was composed of a basic unit of 256 men, called a syntagma. The syntagma was divided into two taxeis (128 men), four tetrarchia (64 men) and the base file (lonchos) of 16 men. The syntagma formed a single pike phalanx “block”, with four syntagma forming a regiment (chiliarchia/merê) of 1,024 men, and further two chilíarchia forming a merarchîa of 2,048 men. The syntagma was the main tactical formation, with the pikemen deployed in files eight, sixteen or thirty-two men deep, though sixteen was the standard. The thinner but longer formation enabled by having the files only eight men deep covered more ground, but sacrificed both staying power by omitting depth as well as offensive capability by reducing the “push of the pike” to half, at a negative exponential rate. The doubly deep thirty-two strong files are recorded as used only a few times, notably at the Battle of Raphia in 217 BCE and the Battle of Magnesia in 189.
The phalangites were generally quite heavily armoured by the standards of the time. In the Philippic and Alexandrian armies, the phalangites usually had a linen linothorax cuirass, bronze greaves, and bronze helmets of a Phrygian design or a stripped version of the Corinthian design as well as a bronze peltê, a round shield sixty centimetres across, held on the left arm and controlled by a neck-strap. Both hands were required to wield the twenty-foot sarissa pike, usually made of cornel and tipped with a fifty centimetre iron spearhead, as well as a solid spear-point iron counterweight at the other end. The counterweight stabilized the long pike, which was made up of two parts joined in the middle and fastened by an iron or bronze band, and was disassembled and carried over-shoulder on the march. In addition the phalangites carried either a kopis curved sword or a straight-blade macharia or xiphos for close-in fighting and personal defence.
In battle, the syntagmas formed into ranks, most commonly sixteen lonchos of sixteen men. Further four “divisions” were formed across, with the first quarter holding their pikes horizontally, the second at forty-five degrees angle, the third at roughly sixty degrees and the last quarter holding their sarissas vertically. This was the infamous “push of the pike” with at least three other ranks of pikes pointing towards the enemy even if he managed somehow to get past the first. The slanted pikes of the other phalangites served as protection from missiles. Relatively little is known of the training of the phalangites, but Diodoros relates how Philip II made his troops march thirty miles on a single day with full gear and provisions, as well as providing only one servant per dekas (“ten”, roughly the equivalent of a Roman “tent party” and more likely eight men given the Macedonian practice of operating by powers of two) which preceded the Marian reforms and the “Marian mules” by around three hundred years. What is to be inferred despite the silence of the sources is that a lengthy and rigorous training process was required to train a phalangite. The unwieldy nature of the sarissa and the awkward handling of the strapped-on shield required a process of acclimatization, and the closely packed formation required immaculately tight drill. Quintus Curtius notes how the phalanx stood “man next to man, arms interlocked with arms”, which paints a clear picture how closely the individual soldier had to operate with one another, and the need for drill to make this not only feasible but effective. The phalanx formation apparently could assume either open, close and “locked-shields” order (pyknosis and synapismos for the latter two, in which pyknosis order the files occupied 90cm of space and in synapismos the file occupied merely 45 or 52cm, around half a metre of frontage). Buglers and signallers with banners communicated the orders of the officers during battle. There is no indication that the Macedonian or Successor unit flags had any sort of symbolic meaning or honour attached, but were simply of a practical nature. Arrian relates how drummers and flute players cadenced the marching phalanxes, but it is unknown if this practice was kept up over time.
Polyainos and Curtius tells us that the Alexandrian phalanx was called pezhetairoi (“foot-companions”, as opposed to the elite cavalry guard “companions”, simply hetairoi) and that they were originally nine thousand strong. However, Polyainos wrote in the 2nd century AD, and Curtius a century earlier. The fact that the overall phalanx numbered some thirty thousand at the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BCE suggests that at least the “nine thousand” estimate is off, and it is more likely chiliarchai were known by their regional affiliation. At the very least the pezhetairoi name is not used outside the Antigonid kingdom following the death of Alexander. There is also the elite hypaspistai (“shield-bearers”) unit, of around three thousand, which fought primarily as phalangites as well, though were also apparently used as “specialized” infantry and could fight in looser formations with swords and javelins as well. They were for instance used as “forlorn hope” assault forces in sieges, led amphibious crossings and even accompanied Alexander’s cavalry in the massive flank manoeuvre at Gaugamela (literally keeping track with the cavalry, which suggests they had shed some of their heavy equipment in addition to having formidable stamina). During at least parts of Alexander’s campaigns against the Persians, the Macedonian phalanx was deployed eight deep, with the allied Greek phalanx (armed and trained in the traditional hoplite style) forming eight deep behind the Macedonians. This served to extend the Macedonian infantry line against the usually numerically superior Persian armies, while not sacrificing depth and formation robustness, though the combat efficiency must have been lower than a regular sixteen deep Macedonian phalanx, given the shorter reach of the hoplites armed with the three metre long dory spear.
How so did the Macedonian-style phalanx change over the course of the Hellenistic period? First we need consider the changes in the political environment surrounding the rulers and wielders of military power over the course of the three centuries that the Hellenistic kingdoms existed following Alexander’s death.
Philip and Alexander were first faced with defeating their “domestic” enemies in the Balkans and the Greek peninsula during the Third and Fourth Sacred Wars and the subjugation of the Illyrian and Thracian tribes north of Macedon. In these conflicts the heavy phalanx and the superb Macedonian cavalry outmatched their opponents in terms of superior tactical handling as well as equipment and training. Next, during Alexander’s invasion of Persia, the phalanx supported by allied and mercenary infantry of both heavy and light types proved superior to the Persian infantry, much thanks to their heavier armour and the inability of the Persians to create an effective countermeasure to the impenetrability of the forward facing Macedonian phalanx. The favourite tactic of Alexander, of pinning the Persian army on the sarissai of the phalanx and then flanking and destroying the Persians using cavalry, proved effective time and time again. During the latter phase of the anabasis, the Macedonians often found themselves fighting asymmetrically, engaging tribal forces that refused to fight conventionally and instead used the local terrain to their advantage. The Macedonians quickly had to adapt to this new style of warfare as well as perfecting siege techniques to carry the numerous mountain fortresses of the Sogdian, Baktrian and Median regions. As the grande armeé reached the Indus, they had to face the terrifying war-elephants which they quickly discovered were vulnerable to disembowelling or hamstringing by axes or romphaia. All this meant that the regular infantry of the phalanx had to constantly adapt to changing battle conditions; the skilful ad-hoc reorganization of the army by Alexander and his generals ensured that the infantry did not become a rigid and ineffective branch compared to the ubiquitous elite hetairoi and Thessalian heavy cavalry which formed the striking arm of the grande armeé.
Following Alexander’s death in 323 BCE, the political situation changed dramatically. Within three years, the First Diadochi War had broken out, pitting the royalists led by Perdikkas against Antipater and his camp who sought independent regional rule. At the confrontation between Eumenes and Krateros near the Hellespont and Perdikkas attempted crossing of the Nile at Pelusion in 321, Macedonian (and “Macedonian-style” and “Hellenized” Persian) soldiers were for the first time pitted against each other in battle. As the wars dragged on, it became apparent that the infantry phalanx was not invincible and was on several occasions both forced to retire and even broke up. This was in stark contrast to the army under Alexander which had never experienced defeat, and the Alexandrian phalanx had never broke wholesale, though Curtius tells of individual battalions breaking ranks and fleeing. Eumenes of Kardia, previously Alexander’s secretary and a sleeping military wunderkind, skilfully defeated the armies of Krateros, Neoptolemos and the ferocious Antigonos on several occasions, using a combination of masterful cavalry handling and ensuring a high éspirit-de-corps among his infantry. Interesting to note is the veteran and elite Argyraspides regiment in Eumenes’ army. In India Alexander had granted his hypaspist corps the new name of “Silvershields” and given them bronze shields coated in silver from which the unit took its name. At the time of the Wars of the Diadochi most of this corps was in their sixties and even seventies, originally setting out with Alexander from Macedonia in 336 BCE at the start of the anabasis. Despite their advanced age, the Argyraspides fought not only with distinction, but were responsible for breaking the opposing phalanx on more than one occasion and their very presence were enough to deter the much younger soldiers of Antigonos.
At the Battle of Ipsos in 301 BCE, which pitted the grand alliance of Ptolemy, Seleukos, Lysimachos and Kassandros against Antigonos and his son Demetrios, the number of combatants likely reached 160,000, with the allied phalanx numbering some 45,000 and the Antigonid opposite in excess of 50,000. The battle proved that the most effective way to defeat a sarissa phalanx was through an opposite phalanx with heavier armour and longer sarissai or by outflanking one with cavalry and threatening its rear. This became the start of an arms race of sort over the course of the following two centuries where the phalangites were more and more heavily armoured and used increasingly longer sarissai. At least the phalangites of the Seleukid military were increasingly equipped with metal cuirasses rather than linothorax, considering the Seleukid experience in wars against the primarily bow-armed Iranians, Baktrians and various eastern peoples on the border of the vast Seleukid empire and heavier armour was required. Archaeological evidence show that armour and equipment visually changed over the course of this period. The leg bands that covered the phalangites’ abdomen and thighs became longer and heavier, helmets became more ornate and featured coloured feathers and crests and capes were introduced. There are some signs that point to shields being reduced in size, but this is speculative. The heavier phalanxes of the three “main” kingdoms of Ptolemaic Egypt, Seleukid Asia and Antigonid Macedonia were a response to the others’, locked in an unending cycle of military innovation. The coup de grace so to speak, came in the form of the Seleukid kataphraktoi of Antiochos the Great which completely destroyed the Ptolemaic army at the Battle of Panion in 200 BCE, the shock value of the super-heavy cavalry sufficient to destroy the phalanx front-on. The kataphraktoi and the heavier Seleukid phalanx proved superior again during the wars of Antiochos IV Epiphanes and Ptolemy VI Philometor and put an end to the Seleukid-Ptolemaic century long Syrian Wars.
It is assumed that the death knell of the Macedonian phalanx was sounded at the Battle of Kynoskephalai in 197 BCE when the Romans defeated the army of Philip V of Macedon. The defeats at Magnesia in 189 and Pydna in 167 did nothing but fuel this myth. However, it is telling that in every instance of Roman gladius overcoming Macedonian sarissa was in terrain and circumstances much more favourable to the Romans. The hilly and uneven ground at Kynoskephalai and Pydna reduced the effectiveness of the phalanx as flat ground is required for the phalanx to be effective. It is hard to wield the sarissa up-hill and keep the tight synapismos closed order. At Magnesia the phalanx stood up well to the Roman infantry assaults and were only defeated when the war-elephants seeking cover inside the hollow square of the phalanxes were thrown into confusion and rioted due to constant missile fire. However, the end result was clear, the Hellenistic kingdom of Macedon was conquered by Rome, no matter how uneven the circumstances were at the two major battles fought. It is indicative that there are only a few recorded battles where the Roman legions met the Macedonian-style armies, notably during Pyrrhos’ invasion of Italy, the Macedonian wars and the two major battles of the Seleukid-Roman War of Antiochos. Polybios, Diodoros and Justin all record the awe which the Romans held for the phalanx. On the subject of the gruesomely inflated number of casualties in these battles, I feel it sufficient to simply point out the Roman allegiance these historians had, and the questionable attitude towards historical objectivity observed at the time. The truth is likely to involve much less Hollywood-esque “overcoming all odds” and what could be described as near-Pyrrhic affairs.
As the Hellenistic period passed its zenith and started to give way to Roman supremacy, the previous tendencies observed in the infantry phalanx were apparently reversed. Chainmail armour based on the Roman model became common and the previously ornate equipment became more and more plain in appearance and much of the heavier armour was dropped. The pikes remained at the long length they had attained during the height of the Syrian Wars, somewhere between twenty-four and twenty-six feet long. The Seleukids and Ptolemies established Roman “imitation legionary” regiments, and possibly half of the resurrected Argyraspides infantry guard of the Seleukids (reformed after Seleukos crowned himself king, and became the elite phalangite infantry of the Seleukid army, constantly kept 10,000 strong) were re-trained in the Roman style. The sources for the period following the Sixth Syrian and the Day of Eleusis in 168 are sparse and there are precious few texts concerning Hellenistic warfare that has survived (apart from the accounts of the Roman wars against Mithridates of Pontos). The Seleukids apparently won a series of battles and campaigns against the Parthians employing the traditional troops and tactics, before suffering disastrous defeats which saw the loss of most of the Seleukid territories east of Syria. It is to be inferred that the infantry phalanx came up short against the mainly mounted Parthian armies, and the precarious domestic political climate did the Seleukids absolutely no favours and was one of the major reasons why a more effective defence could not be mounted. By the time of Caesar’s campaign in Egypt in 47 and 46 BCE, the Egyptian army still employed troops “armed in the Greek manner” which likely means “Hellenic”, i.e. Greco-Macedonian. The quality of the Ptolemaic army was at this point very poor and it suffered a major defeat at the Battle of the Nile in 46 BCE, securing Roman dominance over Egypt.
With the death of Kleopatra VII following the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE, the Hellenistic period came to a definite end. With it died the Greco-Macedonian world, as well as the Greco-Macedonian way of waging war. Apart from a short-lived attempt by Emperor Alexander Severus to create a Macedonian corps in the mid-200s CE, the world would not see the return of the tight pike formation before the Renaissance and the 15th and 16th centuries.
Literature and sources:
Bar-Kochva, Bezalel: The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History
Johstono, Paul, A: Military Institutions and State Formation in the Hellenistic Kingdoms
Polybios: The Histories
Polyainos: Stratagems
Quintus Curtius: History of the Wars of Alexander the Great
Sekunda, Nick: Seleucid & Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168-145 BC: Vol. 1 - The Seleucid Army under Antiochus IV Epiphanes
Syvänne, Ilkka: Macedonian Art of War: The Balkans 335 BC, The Granicus River 334 BC and Gaugamela 331 BC
Troncoso, Victor A. T. and Enson, Edward (eds.): After Alexander: The Time of the Diadochi (323-281 BC)
The infamous Macedonian phalanx, the evolution of the hoplite phalanx of the Greek city-states, was for almost three whole centuries the dominant infantry formation and backbone of the greatest kingdoms in the Levantine and eastern Mediterranean basin. Developed by King Philip II of Macedonia, it was inspired by his time as a “guest” in Thebes, where he observed the tactics and organization of the Theban hoplite army, which differed in many ways from the traditional one of Athenian and Spartan fame. Philip would incorporate these concepts in his military reforms, along with his own ideas and organized to accommodate the peasant-army of Macedon, compared to the part-time professional citizen militia of the Greek cities.
A quick overview is warranted as the tactical make-up of the phalanx remained virtually unchanged over the centuries; Philip’s Macedonian phalanx (plural: phalanxes, a pikeman in the phalanx is called a phalangite) was composed of a basic unit of 256 men, called a syntagma. The syntagma was divided into two taxeis (128 men), four tetrarchia (64 men) and the base file (lonchos) of 16 men. The syntagma formed a single pike phalanx “block”, with four syntagma forming a regiment (chiliarchia/merê) of 1,024 men, and further two chilíarchia forming a merarchîa of 2,048 men. The syntagma was the main tactical formation, with the pikemen deployed in files eight, sixteen or thirty-two men deep, though sixteen was the standard. The thinner but longer formation enabled by having the files only eight men deep covered more ground, but sacrificed both staying power by omitting depth as well as offensive capability by reducing the “push of the pike” to half, at a negative exponential rate. The doubly deep thirty-two strong files are recorded as used only a few times, notably at the Battle of Raphia in 217 BCE and the Battle of Magnesia in 189.
The phalangites were generally quite heavily armoured by the standards of the time. In the Philippic and Alexandrian armies, the phalangites usually had a linen linothorax cuirass, bronze greaves, and bronze helmets of a Phrygian design or a stripped version of the Corinthian design as well as a bronze peltê, a round shield sixty centimetres across, held on the left arm and controlled by a neck-strap. Both hands were required to wield the twenty-foot sarissa pike, usually made of cornel and tipped with a fifty centimetre iron spearhead, as well as a solid spear-point iron counterweight at the other end. The counterweight stabilized the long pike, which was made up of two parts joined in the middle and fastened by an iron or bronze band, and was disassembled and carried over-shoulder on the march. In addition the phalangites carried either a kopis curved sword or a straight-blade macharia or xiphos for close-in fighting and personal defence.
In battle, the syntagmas formed into ranks, most commonly sixteen lonchos of sixteen men. Further four “divisions” were formed across, with the first quarter holding their pikes horizontally, the second at forty-five degrees angle, the third at roughly sixty degrees and the last quarter holding their sarissas vertically. This was the infamous “push of the pike” with at least three other ranks of pikes pointing towards the enemy even if he managed somehow to get past the first. The slanted pikes of the other phalangites served as protection from missiles. Relatively little is known of the training of the phalangites, but Diodoros relates how Philip II made his troops march thirty miles on a single day with full gear and provisions, as well as providing only one servant per dekas (“ten”, roughly the equivalent of a Roman “tent party” and more likely eight men given the Macedonian practice of operating by powers of two) which preceded the Marian reforms and the “Marian mules” by around three hundred years. What is to be inferred despite the silence of the sources is that a lengthy and rigorous training process was required to train a phalangite. The unwieldy nature of the sarissa and the awkward handling of the strapped-on shield required a process of acclimatization, and the closely packed formation required immaculately tight drill. Quintus Curtius notes how the phalanx stood “man next to man, arms interlocked with arms”, which paints a clear picture how closely the individual soldier had to operate with one another, and the need for drill to make this not only feasible but effective. The phalanx formation apparently could assume either open, close and “locked-shields” order (pyknosis and synapismos for the latter two, in which pyknosis order the files occupied 90cm of space and in synapismos the file occupied merely 45 or 52cm, around half a metre of frontage). Buglers and signallers with banners communicated the orders of the officers during battle. There is no indication that the Macedonian or Successor unit flags had any sort of symbolic meaning or honour attached, but were simply of a practical nature. Arrian relates how drummers and flute players cadenced the marching phalanxes, but it is unknown if this practice was kept up over time.
Polyainos and Curtius tells us that the Alexandrian phalanx was called pezhetairoi (“foot-companions”, as opposed to the elite cavalry guard “companions”, simply hetairoi) and that they were originally nine thousand strong. However, Polyainos wrote in the 2nd century AD, and Curtius a century earlier. The fact that the overall phalanx numbered some thirty thousand at the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BCE suggests that at least the “nine thousand” estimate is off, and it is more likely chiliarchai were known by their regional affiliation. At the very least the pezhetairoi name is not used outside the Antigonid kingdom following the death of Alexander. There is also the elite hypaspistai (“shield-bearers”) unit, of around three thousand, which fought primarily as phalangites as well, though were also apparently used as “specialized” infantry and could fight in looser formations with swords and javelins as well. They were for instance used as “forlorn hope” assault forces in sieges, led amphibious crossings and even accompanied Alexander’s cavalry in the massive flank manoeuvre at Gaugamela (literally keeping track with the cavalry, which suggests they had shed some of their heavy equipment in addition to having formidable stamina). During at least parts of Alexander’s campaigns against the Persians, the Macedonian phalanx was deployed eight deep, with the allied Greek phalanx (armed and trained in the traditional hoplite style) forming eight deep behind the Macedonians. This served to extend the Macedonian infantry line against the usually numerically superior Persian armies, while not sacrificing depth and formation robustness, though the combat efficiency must have been lower than a regular sixteen deep Macedonian phalanx, given the shorter reach of the hoplites armed with the three metre long dory spear.
How so did the Macedonian-style phalanx change over the course of the Hellenistic period? First we need consider the changes in the political environment surrounding the rulers and wielders of military power over the course of the three centuries that the Hellenistic kingdoms existed following Alexander’s death.
Philip and Alexander were first faced with defeating their “domestic” enemies in the Balkans and the Greek peninsula during the Third and Fourth Sacred Wars and the subjugation of the Illyrian and Thracian tribes north of Macedon. In these conflicts the heavy phalanx and the superb Macedonian cavalry outmatched their opponents in terms of superior tactical handling as well as equipment and training. Next, during Alexander’s invasion of Persia, the phalanx supported by allied and mercenary infantry of both heavy and light types proved superior to the Persian infantry, much thanks to their heavier armour and the inability of the Persians to create an effective countermeasure to the impenetrability of the forward facing Macedonian phalanx. The favourite tactic of Alexander, of pinning the Persian army on the sarissai of the phalanx and then flanking and destroying the Persians using cavalry, proved effective time and time again. During the latter phase of the anabasis, the Macedonians often found themselves fighting asymmetrically, engaging tribal forces that refused to fight conventionally and instead used the local terrain to their advantage. The Macedonians quickly had to adapt to this new style of warfare as well as perfecting siege techniques to carry the numerous mountain fortresses of the Sogdian, Baktrian and Median regions. As the grande armeé reached the Indus, they had to face the terrifying war-elephants which they quickly discovered were vulnerable to disembowelling or hamstringing by axes or romphaia. All this meant that the regular infantry of the phalanx had to constantly adapt to changing battle conditions; the skilful ad-hoc reorganization of the army by Alexander and his generals ensured that the infantry did not become a rigid and ineffective branch compared to the ubiquitous elite hetairoi and Thessalian heavy cavalry which formed the striking arm of the grande armeé.
Following Alexander’s death in 323 BCE, the political situation changed dramatically. Within three years, the First Diadochi War had broken out, pitting the royalists led by Perdikkas against Antipater and his camp who sought independent regional rule. At the confrontation between Eumenes and Krateros near the Hellespont and Perdikkas attempted crossing of the Nile at Pelusion in 321, Macedonian (and “Macedonian-style” and “Hellenized” Persian) soldiers were for the first time pitted against each other in battle. As the wars dragged on, it became apparent that the infantry phalanx was not invincible and was on several occasions both forced to retire and even broke up. This was in stark contrast to the army under Alexander which had never experienced defeat, and the Alexandrian phalanx had never broke wholesale, though Curtius tells of individual battalions breaking ranks and fleeing. Eumenes of Kardia, previously Alexander’s secretary and a sleeping military wunderkind, skilfully defeated the armies of Krateros, Neoptolemos and the ferocious Antigonos on several occasions, using a combination of masterful cavalry handling and ensuring a high éspirit-de-corps among his infantry. Interesting to note is the veteran and elite Argyraspides regiment in Eumenes’ army. In India Alexander had granted his hypaspist corps the new name of “Silvershields” and given them bronze shields coated in silver from which the unit took its name. At the time of the Wars of the Diadochi most of this corps was in their sixties and even seventies, originally setting out with Alexander from Macedonia in 336 BCE at the start of the anabasis. Despite their advanced age, the Argyraspides fought not only with distinction, but were responsible for breaking the opposing phalanx on more than one occasion and their very presence were enough to deter the much younger soldiers of Antigonos.
At the Battle of Ipsos in 301 BCE, which pitted the grand alliance of Ptolemy, Seleukos, Lysimachos and Kassandros against Antigonos and his son Demetrios, the number of combatants likely reached 160,000, with the allied phalanx numbering some 45,000 and the Antigonid opposite in excess of 50,000. The battle proved that the most effective way to defeat a sarissa phalanx was through an opposite phalanx with heavier armour and longer sarissai or by outflanking one with cavalry and threatening its rear. This became the start of an arms race of sort over the course of the following two centuries where the phalangites were more and more heavily armoured and used increasingly longer sarissai. At least the phalangites of the Seleukid military were increasingly equipped with metal cuirasses rather than linothorax, considering the Seleukid experience in wars against the primarily bow-armed Iranians, Baktrians and various eastern peoples on the border of the vast Seleukid empire and heavier armour was required. Archaeological evidence show that armour and equipment visually changed over the course of this period. The leg bands that covered the phalangites’ abdomen and thighs became longer and heavier, helmets became more ornate and featured coloured feathers and crests and capes were introduced. There are some signs that point to shields being reduced in size, but this is speculative. The heavier phalanxes of the three “main” kingdoms of Ptolemaic Egypt, Seleukid Asia and Antigonid Macedonia were a response to the others’, locked in an unending cycle of military innovation. The coup de grace so to speak, came in the form of the Seleukid kataphraktoi of Antiochos the Great which completely destroyed the Ptolemaic army at the Battle of Panion in 200 BCE, the shock value of the super-heavy cavalry sufficient to destroy the phalanx front-on. The kataphraktoi and the heavier Seleukid phalanx proved superior again during the wars of Antiochos IV Epiphanes and Ptolemy VI Philometor and put an end to the Seleukid-Ptolemaic century long Syrian Wars.
It is assumed that the death knell of the Macedonian phalanx was sounded at the Battle of Kynoskephalai in 197 BCE when the Romans defeated the army of Philip V of Macedon. The defeats at Magnesia in 189 and Pydna in 167 did nothing but fuel this myth. However, it is telling that in every instance of Roman gladius overcoming Macedonian sarissa was in terrain and circumstances much more favourable to the Romans. The hilly and uneven ground at Kynoskephalai and Pydna reduced the effectiveness of the phalanx as flat ground is required for the phalanx to be effective. It is hard to wield the sarissa up-hill and keep the tight synapismos closed order. At Magnesia the phalanx stood up well to the Roman infantry assaults and were only defeated when the war-elephants seeking cover inside the hollow square of the phalanxes were thrown into confusion and rioted due to constant missile fire. However, the end result was clear, the Hellenistic kingdom of Macedon was conquered by Rome, no matter how uneven the circumstances were at the two major battles fought. It is indicative that there are only a few recorded battles where the Roman legions met the Macedonian-style armies, notably during Pyrrhos’ invasion of Italy, the Macedonian wars and the two major battles of the Seleukid-Roman War of Antiochos. Polybios, Diodoros and Justin all record the awe which the Romans held for the phalanx. On the subject of the gruesomely inflated number of casualties in these battles, I feel it sufficient to simply point out the Roman allegiance these historians had, and the questionable attitude towards historical objectivity observed at the time. The truth is likely to involve much less Hollywood-esque “overcoming all odds” and what could be described as near-Pyrrhic affairs.
As the Hellenistic period passed its zenith and started to give way to Roman supremacy, the previous tendencies observed in the infantry phalanx were apparently reversed. Chainmail armour based on the Roman model became common and the previously ornate equipment became more and more plain in appearance and much of the heavier armour was dropped. The pikes remained at the long length they had attained during the height of the Syrian Wars, somewhere between twenty-four and twenty-six feet long. The Seleukids and Ptolemies established Roman “imitation legionary” regiments, and possibly half of the resurrected Argyraspides infantry guard of the Seleukids (reformed after Seleukos crowned himself king, and became the elite phalangite infantry of the Seleukid army, constantly kept 10,000 strong) were re-trained in the Roman style. The sources for the period following the Sixth Syrian and the Day of Eleusis in 168 are sparse and there are precious few texts concerning Hellenistic warfare that has survived (apart from the accounts of the Roman wars against Mithridates of Pontos). The Seleukids apparently won a series of battles and campaigns against the Parthians employing the traditional troops and tactics, before suffering disastrous defeats which saw the loss of most of the Seleukid territories east of Syria. It is to be inferred that the infantry phalanx came up short against the mainly mounted Parthian armies, and the precarious domestic political climate did the Seleukids absolutely no favours and was one of the major reasons why a more effective defence could not be mounted. By the time of Caesar’s campaign in Egypt in 47 and 46 BCE, the Egyptian army still employed troops “armed in the Greek manner” which likely means “Hellenic”, i.e. Greco-Macedonian. The quality of the Ptolemaic army was at this point very poor and it suffered a major defeat at the Battle of the Nile in 46 BCE, securing Roman dominance over Egypt.
With the death of Kleopatra VII following the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE, the Hellenistic period came to a definite end. With it died the Greco-Macedonian world, as well as the Greco-Macedonian way of waging war. Apart from a short-lived attempt by Emperor Alexander Severus to create a Macedonian corps in the mid-200s CE, the world would not see the return of the tight pike formation before the Renaissance and the 15th and 16th centuries.
Literature and sources:
Bar-Kochva, Bezalel: The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History
Johstono, Paul, A: Military Institutions and State Formation in the Hellenistic Kingdoms
Polybios: The Histories
Polyainos: Stratagems
Quintus Curtius: History of the Wars of Alexander the Great
Sekunda, Nick: Seleucid & Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168-145 BC: Vol. 1 - The Seleucid Army under Antiochus IV Epiphanes
Syvänne, Ilkka: Macedonian Art of War: The Balkans 335 BC, The Granicus River 334 BC and Gaugamela 331 BC
Troncoso, Victor A. T. and Enson, Edward (eds.): After Alexander: The Time of the Diadochi (323-281 BC)