De Rei Bellum Boreale Magnus: The Army of Karl XII of Sweden
Jul 26, 2017 12:30:19 GMT
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Post by Silver on Jul 26, 2017 12:30:19 GMT
De Rei Bellum Boreale Magnus: The Army of Karl XII of Sweden
Introduction
At the outbreak of war in February 1700 Sweden had one of the finest militaries in Europe which had carved out a name for itself during the Thirty Years War of 1618-48 under the inspired leadership of Gustav II Adolf Vasa. During the reign of Karl XI (1660-1697) the army was further reorganized into the infamous indelningsverket ("allotment system") and the uniforms and equipment modernized and standardized to a very high degree. This army, well-trained, well-equipped and well-led were to be tested again and again on the battlefields of northern Europe for two decades and was by the end of the war a mere shell of what it had been at the beginning of the conflict.
By the time of Karl XII's coronation in 1697 the Swedish Baltic empire encompassed Sweden, modern Estonia, Latvia, parts of Lithuania as well as Finland and large tracts of Germany's Baltic coastline. Sweden still enjoyed a reputation as one of the major powers of Europe, although a bit tentatively and as much thanks to the weakness of her Baltic rivals as any real claim of hegemonic power. The once vast commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania had over the past century been rattled by a number of civil wars, dynastic struggles and wars with both Russia and Sweden. Russia was still considered a semi-barbarous country on the very fringes of civilization and had still to experience the massive reforms of Tsar Peter I. Denmark-Norway had been habitually humiliated by Swedish arms during the 17th Century and had finally lost Scania, Bohuslän and Jämtland to Sweden after the Scanian War ended in 1679, the defeat reducing Denmark to the status of tertiary power in the eyes of contemporaries.
Indelningsverket, recruitment and organization
Karl XII inherited an army numbering some 75,000 men, a most impressive size given the modest economic and manpower resources of Sweden. Key to maintaining, training and reinforcing this army was the indelingsverket, a system of national service which replaced the payment of regular taxes to the Crown. Important to understanding indelningsverket is taking into consideration the simultaneous reduction (“the Great Reduction”) where large territories belonging to the upper nobility was expropriated by the Crown and given out to the peasantry and the gentry. This in effect crippled the power of the Swedish aristocracy, but earned King Karl XI the complete admiration of the Swedish people and lower nobility. More farms and villages were suddenly paying taxes to the Crown rather than to the upkeep of the nobility. On top of these land reforms came the new allotment system, in which two or more farms (which at this time were more akin to the medieval villes or mansions with a number of households incorporated into a single farm unit) were combined into rotes and were obliged to provide, clothe, feed and equip a single soldier. This served as the basis for the indelta regementen (trans. “provincial regiments”) which formed the core of the army, one regiment from each of the major Swedish and Finnish counties. These regiments would meet annually for training and exercises, much like modern day territorial or reserve units. The farms that took part in the allotment system were exempt from paying ordinary taxes, which meant that while the Swedish chancery lost direct revenue, the kingdom had a standing army that in large parts paid for itself and which only required pay while on campaign, not all year around.
The indelta cavalry regiments were recruited a bit differently. Generally a member of the gentry was obliged to provide a cavalryman, complete with horse and equipment, in return for tax exemption, and four households/mansions would also combine to equip a riding servant as well as other types of cavalry equipment and extra horses.
In addition to the indelta regiments were the regular värvade or enlisted regiments, units chartered and in the direct keep and pay of the Crown. These were chiefly the guard regiments, the German regiments and the garrison units spread across the different parts of the Baltic territories. When the Great Northern War began this part of the army was relatively small, both compared to other countries’ militaries and the indelta portion of the army, and a large number of units were recruited, mainly in the territories but also from prisoners of war. The enlisted regiments were apparently both of the “inhaber” variant with a colonel in charge of recruitment, training and equipping the troops and also regiments chartered directly to the Ministry of War and the Chancery, particularly the guard and liv- regiments (trans. “royal”, lit. “life”). The majority of troops in the enlisted regiments were Swedish subjects, i.e. Swedes, Finns, Livonians and Pomeranian Germans, but especially as the war progressed a large number of foreigners were recruited. Examples of this are the Vlach auxiliary cavalry employed as scouts and raiders, as well as regiments of Saxons, Swiss and Hanoverians recruited from prisoners of war and put into Swedish service, with a somewhat comme ci comme ça outcome.
Ultimately this military structure enabled Sweden to harness and employ its meagre manpower resources as effectively as possible and enabled Karl XII to field an army proportionally much larger than most other nations of Europe. This came at the cost of putting almost the entire able-bodied manpower pool of Sweden on the field at the same time with next to no reserve. The farm rotar were not obliged to provide more than the one soldier and if that man fell it was often almost impossible to replace him. Early on the army was expanded by recruiting tremänningsregementen (lit. “three-man regiments”) where three roter in some counties were to combine to provide an additional soldier, and even later a number of femmänningsregementen (“five-men regiments”) were ordered raised. Replacements in the indelta regementen were volunteer enlistees as well as from the counties of Scania which had been conquered relatively recently and before 1711 entirely Scanian regiments were not to be raised as the loyalty of the populace was in question. This is the chief reason why the disastrous Poltava campaign in effect ended Sweden’s bid to win the war as the losses of the majority of the Swedish indelta regiments were almost irreplaceable.
The Swedish infantry regiments were, at least initially, armed with flintlock muskets and pikes to a ratio of two-thirds of the troops with muskets and one-third with pikes. This could be perceived as conservative and even obdurate considering the European tendency to move away from musket-pike formations to all-musket units. However it was an important part of the Swedish aggressive infantry tactics (often anachronistically called the Gå-På,”Onwards”, tactic). While remaining as silent as possible the Swedish infantry would close to within forty paces of the enemy, fire a volley, reload and advance to within a dozen paces or so and fire another volley before charging home with bayonets and pikes. This contrasted with the more in vogue “Dutch style” of regiments formed three deep and continually firing by kneeling and standing, but it suited the Swedes very well and especially the very offensively minded Karl XII and it had an undeniable shock value which proved very effective on the battlefield. Following the Battle of Poltava in 1709 the pikes were dropped and regiments became fully armed with muskets. The cavalry was divided into regiments of horse and dragoons. Dragoons (with the sole exception of the Jämtland dragonregemente) fought as regular cavalry with sabres and carbines. The Swedish cavalry rode “knee to knee” in tight formation at full gallop and delivered a close-in pistol and carbine volley before driving the charge home with steel. Again, this contrasted with the mainland European tactic of charging at trot and firing several volleys before closing. No new regiments of horse were raised during the war, only dragoon regiments, as the dragoons were given less pay, inferior mounts and less training than cuirassiers and “proper” cavalrymen, clearly the cheaper option for a kingdom strapped of cash and men. The Swedish artillery arm was quite small and its gun park was apparently divided into light three- and six-pounder field guns and much heavier positional and siege pieces, and the artillery did not feature heavily in any of the major battles of the Great Northern War, the exception being the Battle of Gadebusch in 1712 and the Russian artillery redoubts at Poltava.
The Swedish infantry uniforms at the start of the war were almost exclusively blue coats with yellow facings, trousers, collars, and stockings, a decree given by Karl XI. A few exceptions were made for the indelta Närke-Varmland, Jönköping and Västerbotten regiments which had respectively red, dark orange and white facings and socks. In addition some regiments had either blue socks or trousers, but apart from the three aforementioned regiments, all infantry regiments at the start of the war wore a colour variation of blue and yellow. The Swedish wore their coats with the tails turned up and in, much like uniforms would be worn later in the 18th Century, and was one of the first militaries to completely adopt the tricorne hat, which made the Swedish army perhaps the most avant garde military fashion-wise at the time. The cavalry was clothed somewhat differently. The dragoons, following the “mounted infantry” logic, were given uniforms similar to the infantry with blue frocks and yellow facings and collar, but with long black leather cavalry boots (the Bohuslän dragoons apparently wore green and yellow uniforms). The guard, royal and cuirassier regiments usually wore dark blue uniforms with either golden or silver details and linings, or white/light grey uniforms. Steel half-cuirasses either in polished steel or black were worn on top of the tunics. Cavalrymen were armed with straight-blade sabres and two long-barrelled pistols while dragoons had a flintlock carbine instead of pistols, the sabre being the main weapon.
The infantry standards differed from varväde and indelta regiments. Each company had a standard with one of the companies designated the livkompani (“royal company”) which carried livfanan (“royal colours”, often translated as “Colonel’s colours”) which featured the Swedish coat of arms held by two lions and a crown on a field of white. This was common to all infantry regiments. The regular kompanifana were the regimental colours which featured in the case of the varväde regiments usually a field of blue or sometimes yellow and often charges such as crowns and royal monograms in combination with effects such as palm leaves or wreaths. The indelta regiments had standards carrying their respective county (län) charges and symbols, often surrounded by green wreaths on differing coloured fields, most of them quite colourful and detailed. The cavalry had smaller standards, but also divided into kompani- and livfanor and they usually carried different charges on each side.
The Swedish officer corps was, unlike their enemies, mostly home-grown with only a minority of officers of foreign birth (the Russian officer corps being the opposite). At the start of the war a bit more than half of the officers were nobles, while it had sunk to around a third at the end of the war, the need for more officers and casualties accounting for the drop-off. Being a noble was not a necessity for becoming an officer, rather being an officer was a pretty sure-fire way to become a noble as a promotion to major or colonel more or less guaranteed ennoblement. Karl XI also partly humorously and partly thought provokingly made it mandatory for officers to complete the same training course as their regiments’ privates did and serve for a time in subordinate ranks. Although not very popular, the practice no doubt helped engender a bond of sympathy between officers and the men they led.
(Cont.)
Introduction
At the outbreak of war in February 1700 Sweden had one of the finest militaries in Europe which had carved out a name for itself during the Thirty Years War of 1618-48 under the inspired leadership of Gustav II Adolf Vasa. During the reign of Karl XI (1660-1697) the army was further reorganized into the infamous indelningsverket ("allotment system") and the uniforms and equipment modernized and standardized to a very high degree. This army, well-trained, well-equipped and well-led were to be tested again and again on the battlefields of northern Europe for two decades and was by the end of the war a mere shell of what it had been at the beginning of the conflict.
By the time of Karl XII's coronation in 1697 the Swedish Baltic empire encompassed Sweden, modern Estonia, Latvia, parts of Lithuania as well as Finland and large tracts of Germany's Baltic coastline. Sweden still enjoyed a reputation as one of the major powers of Europe, although a bit tentatively and as much thanks to the weakness of her Baltic rivals as any real claim of hegemonic power. The once vast commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania had over the past century been rattled by a number of civil wars, dynastic struggles and wars with both Russia and Sweden. Russia was still considered a semi-barbarous country on the very fringes of civilization and had still to experience the massive reforms of Tsar Peter I. Denmark-Norway had been habitually humiliated by Swedish arms during the 17th Century and had finally lost Scania, Bohuslän and Jämtland to Sweden after the Scanian War ended in 1679, the defeat reducing Denmark to the status of tertiary power in the eyes of contemporaries.
Indelningsverket, recruitment and organization
Karl XII inherited an army numbering some 75,000 men, a most impressive size given the modest economic and manpower resources of Sweden. Key to maintaining, training and reinforcing this army was the indelingsverket, a system of national service which replaced the payment of regular taxes to the Crown. Important to understanding indelningsverket is taking into consideration the simultaneous reduction (“the Great Reduction”) where large territories belonging to the upper nobility was expropriated by the Crown and given out to the peasantry and the gentry. This in effect crippled the power of the Swedish aristocracy, but earned King Karl XI the complete admiration of the Swedish people and lower nobility. More farms and villages were suddenly paying taxes to the Crown rather than to the upkeep of the nobility. On top of these land reforms came the new allotment system, in which two or more farms (which at this time were more akin to the medieval villes or mansions with a number of households incorporated into a single farm unit) were combined into rotes and were obliged to provide, clothe, feed and equip a single soldier. This served as the basis for the indelta regementen (trans. “provincial regiments”) which formed the core of the army, one regiment from each of the major Swedish and Finnish counties. These regiments would meet annually for training and exercises, much like modern day territorial or reserve units. The farms that took part in the allotment system were exempt from paying ordinary taxes, which meant that while the Swedish chancery lost direct revenue, the kingdom had a standing army that in large parts paid for itself and which only required pay while on campaign, not all year around.
The indelta cavalry regiments were recruited a bit differently. Generally a member of the gentry was obliged to provide a cavalryman, complete with horse and equipment, in return for tax exemption, and four households/mansions would also combine to equip a riding servant as well as other types of cavalry equipment and extra horses.
In addition to the indelta regiments were the regular värvade or enlisted regiments, units chartered and in the direct keep and pay of the Crown. These were chiefly the guard regiments, the German regiments and the garrison units spread across the different parts of the Baltic territories. When the Great Northern War began this part of the army was relatively small, both compared to other countries’ militaries and the indelta portion of the army, and a large number of units were recruited, mainly in the territories but also from prisoners of war. The enlisted regiments were apparently both of the “inhaber” variant with a colonel in charge of recruitment, training and equipping the troops and also regiments chartered directly to the Ministry of War and the Chancery, particularly the guard and liv- regiments (trans. “royal”, lit. “life”). The majority of troops in the enlisted regiments were Swedish subjects, i.e. Swedes, Finns, Livonians and Pomeranian Germans, but especially as the war progressed a large number of foreigners were recruited. Examples of this are the Vlach auxiliary cavalry employed as scouts and raiders, as well as regiments of Saxons, Swiss and Hanoverians recruited from prisoners of war and put into Swedish service, with a somewhat comme ci comme ça outcome.
Ultimately this military structure enabled Sweden to harness and employ its meagre manpower resources as effectively as possible and enabled Karl XII to field an army proportionally much larger than most other nations of Europe. This came at the cost of putting almost the entire able-bodied manpower pool of Sweden on the field at the same time with next to no reserve. The farm rotar were not obliged to provide more than the one soldier and if that man fell it was often almost impossible to replace him. Early on the army was expanded by recruiting tremänningsregementen (lit. “three-man regiments”) where three roter in some counties were to combine to provide an additional soldier, and even later a number of femmänningsregementen (“five-men regiments”) were ordered raised. Replacements in the indelta regementen were volunteer enlistees as well as from the counties of Scania which had been conquered relatively recently and before 1711 entirely Scanian regiments were not to be raised as the loyalty of the populace was in question. This is the chief reason why the disastrous Poltava campaign in effect ended Sweden’s bid to win the war as the losses of the majority of the Swedish indelta regiments were almost irreplaceable.
The Swedish infantry regiments were, at least initially, armed with flintlock muskets and pikes to a ratio of two-thirds of the troops with muskets and one-third with pikes. This could be perceived as conservative and even obdurate considering the European tendency to move away from musket-pike formations to all-musket units. However it was an important part of the Swedish aggressive infantry tactics (often anachronistically called the Gå-På,”Onwards”, tactic). While remaining as silent as possible the Swedish infantry would close to within forty paces of the enemy, fire a volley, reload and advance to within a dozen paces or so and fire another volley before charging home with bayonets and pikes. This contrasted with the more in vogue “Dutch style” of regiments formed three deep and continually firing by kneeling and standing, but it suited the Swedes very well and especially the very offensively minded Karl XII and it had an undeniable shock value which proved very effective on the battlefield. Following the Battle of Poltava in 1709 the pikes were dropped and regiments became fully armed with muskets. The cavalry was divided into regiments of horse and dragoons. Dragoons (with the sole exception of the Jämtland dragonregemente) fought as regular cavalry with sabres and carbines. The Swedish cavalry rode “knee to knee” in tight formation at full gallop and delivered a close-in pistol and carbine volley before driving the charge home with steel. Again, this contrasted with the mainland European tactic of charging at trot and firing several volleys before closing. No new regiments of horse were raised during the war, only dragoon regiments, as the dragoons were given less pay, inferior mounts and less training than cuirassiers and “proper” cavalrymen, clearly the cheaper option for a kingdom strapped of cash and men. The Swedish artillery arm was quite small and its gun park was apparently divided into light three- and six-pounder field guns and much heavier positional and siege pieces, and the artillery did not feature heavily in any of the major battles of the Great Northern War, the exception being the Battle of Gadebusch in 1712 and the Russian artillery redoubts at Poltava.
The Swedish infantry uniforms at the start of the war were almost exclusively blue coats with yellow facings, trousers, collars, and stockings, a decree given by Karl XI. A few exceptions were made for the indelta Närke-Varmland, Jönköping and Västerbotten regiments which had respectively red, dark orange and white facings and socks. In addition some regiments had either blue socks or trousers, but apart from the three aforementioned regiments, all infantry regiments at the start of the war wore a colour variation of blue and yellow. The Swedish wore their coats with the tails turned up and in, much like uniforms would be worn later in the 18th Century, and was one of the first militaries to completely adopt the tricorne hat, which made the Swedish army perhaps the most avant garde military fashion-wise at the time. The cavalry was clothed somewhat differently. The dragoons, following the “mounted infantry” logic, were given uniforms similar to the infantry with blue frocks and yellow facings and collar, but with long black leather cavalry boots (the Bohuslän dragoons apparently wore green and yellow uniforms). The guard, royal and cuirassier regiments usually wore dark blue uniforms with either golden or silver details and linings, or white/light grey uniforms. Steel half-cuirasses either in polished steel or black were worn on top of the tunics. Cavalrymen were armed with straight-blade sabres and two long-barrelled pistols while dragoons had a flintlock carbine instead of pistols, the sabre being the main weapon.
The infantry standards differed from varväde and indelta regiments. Each company had a standard with one of the companies designated the livkompani (“royal company”) which carried livfanan (“royal colours”, often translated as “Colonel’s colours”) which featured the Swedish coat of arms held by two lions and a crown on a field of white. This was common to all infantry regiments. The regular kompanifana were the regimental colours which featured in the case of the varväde regiments usually a field of blue or sometimes yellow and often charges such as crowns and royal monograms in combination with effects such as palm leaves or wreaths. The indelta regiments had standards carrying their respective county (län) charges and symbols, often surrounded by green wreaths on differing coloured fields, most of them quite colourful and detailed. The cavalry had smaller standards, but also divided into kompani- and livfanor and they usually carried different charges on each side.
The Swedish officer corps was, unlike their enemies, mostly home-grown with only a minority of officers of foreign birth (the Russian officer corps being the opposite). At the start of the war a bit more than half of the officers were nobles, while it had sunk to around a third at the end of the war, the need for more officers and casualties accounting for the drop-off. Being a noble was not a necessity for becoming an officer, rather being an officer was a pretty sure-fire way to become a noble as a promotion to major or colonel more or less guaranteed ennoblement. Karl XI also partly humorously and partly thought provokingly made it mandatory for officers to complete the same training course as their regiments’ privates did and serve for a time in subordinate ranks. Although not very popular, the practice no doubt helped engender a bond of sympathy between officers and the men they led.
(Cont.)